THE JURISTIC PERSON.-II.
The effort to deal with the corporation, now as a name,
again as a form of co-ownership, and yet again as a personality, produces a state of chaos which is as dangerous to
the corporation as to the suitor who seeks redress against
it. A corporation is prosecuted for violation of a law which
makes the acceptance of a lower freight rate than that applicable to the public generally, a misdemeanor. 15 It denies
knowledge of the correct rate, but is convicted of an intent
to violate the law, for which a fine is imposed. The corporation is a large one. Some of its stockholders may be
in China; they have no intent. The corporation is a fictitious being. But fictitious beings have no intent. And collective property has no intent. Hence we convict, we know
not what, we know not whom, of knowledge of the law and
intent to violate it.
A problem of a different sort may arise. There are no
shareholders, and there is, peradventure, nothing of the corporation but a name. 16 The Court has said that this is a
corporation, self-sufficient enough to prevent the associates
being charged as partners pending the issue of stock.
The first conception that is attached legally to a person
of any sort is that of a holder of rights. Persons are regarded as having some common inheritance in a fund of
privileges, which are considered as having an origin beyond
human consciousness. Be their source divine, or let it
reside in the common consent of humanity, they are readily
assented to as the portion of every individual, inviolable
and unassailable. All humanity stands ready to avenge an
affront to any of these so-called natural rights or privileges,
and the world is cosmopolitan in this, that it affords no
, United States v. Standard Oil Co., 155 Fed. Rep. 305.

"In re Western Branch v. Trust Company, 163 Fed. Rep. 713.
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asylum to him who has deprived another of the right of
existence.
Let us consider an idea quite far removed from this. And
we may borrow again, an analogy from mathematics. Suppose an object, a rock, for example, too ponderous to be
moved by less than twenty men. One of them, two or three
of them, exert all of their strength, and the rock stands unmoved. The entire body of twenty exert their strength and
displace it. By what is it moved? By the addition of one
man to another? Scarcely. It is moved by the simultaneous action of a score. For that particular purpose, a portion
of the energy of each individual has been fused into a coinmon fund which is effective only as a fund. Each man,
even while exerting his strength, possesses other attributes,
and each individual while contributing his share of strength
may be using his mind for a different purpose. The collective effort, it will be understood, differs from any individual
effort in effect. If we could classify efforts as genus and
species, we should say that the concerted effort was genus
and the individual effort species.
Upon these two conceptions, viz., the conception of rights
and the conception of concerted action, whether the concerted act be the holding of property, or the organization
by which some great enterprise is carried out, the idea or
theory of the corporation rests.
The idea of rights implies universal rights-since every
one, for the purposes of this discussion, at least, must be
taken, not only to protect his own rights, but to observe
those of others. Hence, in the possession of rights is involved the negative idea of duties. The holder of rights is
likewise a debtor to duties. He owes duties. Does the corporation do either? We may deny this or affirm it. In
either event, the denial or affirmation must be susceptible
of an analysis that will withstand criticism.
Let us examine
17
first the views of those who deny it.

' The statement of the representative theory which follows is epitomized from Freund, The Legal Nature of Corporations.
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i. The corporation is not, as such, the subject of rights
and object of duties, but is a peculiar method of co-ownership of property.
Rights are generally represented by the vesting of control
and interest in property to one person. This does not arise
from necessity and they may, in fact, be separated-the interest may be vested in one and the control in another. We
may think of a right, therefore, as split up into two parts,
viz., control and interest.
In the case of a trust there is a protected interest and
therefore a right. The control and interest are separated
and no one person is the holder of the right in the same
sense as he is in a normal case. But the interest is identified
with some definite person. The trustee having control is
definitely X, and the cestui que trust is definitely Y.
But interests must often be secured in which the right does
not inhere in some definite person. This is true in the case
of charities and the like, where control of the property cannot be vested in the parties in interest, who are indefinite in
number, whose members are unascertainable, constituting
present and future generations, who cannot co-operate in
performing legal acts. For this purpose trust rights are
created.
Where the control is vested in a person for the benefit
of an abstract and ideal interest, the interest must be designated by a name, and the holding of the right must be identified with that name, for the interest has no distinct personal
inherence, that is, it is not definitely owned by A or B or C.
This means that certain relations and resources are controlled, no matter by what particular individuals, for the
service and benefit of well-defined aims and purposes to be
pursued under given conditions and through prescribed
channels, all of which is understood or can be ascertained by
reference to the name of the institution; and conversely an
obligation may exist in favor of some person, to be satisfied
out of certain funds, no matter through whose agency the
payment will be made. We thus personify a complexity of
interests by assimilating it to a personal beneficiary being
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well aware that what we personify has no volition or acting
capacity, a fiction which is as harmless as it is useful, like
so many others to which we resort constantly for the convenience of thought and speech. The personification of the
purpose is necessarily fictitious and the fiction supplies the
absence of any determinate person on the side of the interest, while the control is of course in the hands of real persons. The name of a corporation is merely a cloak for the
action of several persons having identity of purpose.
The idea of the joint relation requires in addition to identity of purpose a conecting tie between a number of persons
with reference to that purpose. Inasmuch as the public cannot control legal rights, as a legally disconnected mass of
individuals, but is merely a beneficiary, the rights of the
public are exercised by the State or its sub-divisions, and in
so far as enjoyment is concerned, by any individual who can
show an interest.
The parties to any joint enterprise have an interest in the
preservation of the joint relation and of the undivided control. This interest is relevant only where co-operation
among the joint parties fails. In the case of disagreement,
the problem arises how joint holding of rights and community of interest can be reconciled with each other. In
the case of partnership the law insists upon concurrent action, the joint relation being dissolved where that fails. This
is impracticable where the permanent relation is a necessity
and is indissoluble, as in the case of a corporation. In such
an event, the law may accept the action of those who do
concur as the action of all the associates, ignoring those who
fail to act. If all of the associates agree as to the action,
but differ as to the method to be pursued, the law may indicate which of the contending parties shall prevail. In either
case all are bound by a portion; that is, all of the associates
act by representation. This is original representation as
distinguished from that which rests upon delegation, such
as agency, and which is common to the exercise of rights
several as well as joint.
Original representation assumes two forms according
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to the circumstances. Where some of the associates entitled
to act abstain from action, those who act, a quorum for example, are regarded as representing all. Where there is a
difference of opinion the majority controls the minority.
Where action by representation is recognized we may
speak of the collective interest of a mere joint holding of
rights. In the case of joint tenancies and tenancies in common, or other joint relations having no representative
action, the principle of representation is not secured to each
party against any other, since all must concur in every act.
Those forms of joint holding in which the principle of
representation is not fully recognized, consist generally of
a small number of joint parties. Where the number of associates is considerable the principle of representation becomes
a practical necessity, and they tend therefore to assume a
collective form of holding of rights. In the case of governmental bodies, actual concurrence of all parties is impossible, and all direct action must be by original representation; likewise, the majority generally prevails. In the case
of a business corporation of small numbers, acts of delegation are generally unanimous and everyone is likely to share
in the joint control. Since representative action is possible,
however, undivided control is likewise possible, and a collective body consequently acts and appears as a unity. The
fact that persons who dissent are bound by the action of
a majority does not mean that they are excluded from the
act of representation. Their act of opposition means that
they are given an opportunity of influencing the formation
of the controlling will and by the assertion of their wishes
and opinions; their failure to control indicates weakness
either of position or of numbers. Abstention from action
means acquiescence in the action of those who have actually
" taken part. A share in the control is legally secured to all
although it may prove incapable of affecting the final act.
The principle of original representation has the effect
that some persons may by their acts dispose of rights belonging to others; or in other words, that rights may be disposed
of without proper legal acts on the part of those to whom
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they belong. Acts done by a person which normally affect
his rights may in this connection fail to have that effect as
to rights held by him with others. The resolution of a majority imposes obligations on the minority, and the deed
of a shareholder purporting to convey an undivided share
in corporate property is wholly ineffectual. The majority
and minority are treated by the law exclusively with reference to a common relation sustained by them to each other
and to a common purpose, and the force Of their acts is
determined accordingly as they express more or less strongly
the fact of the relation. What determines the preference or
exclusion of one party or another is not specific personality,
but the relative position of the person in the representation
of an interest. It is not the question of A, B, C, D against
E and F, but the question of the majority against the minority, or the question of those acting under the common bond
against those failing so to act. The law does not connect the
right with A, B or C, absolutely, but only in so far as they
remain within a certain sphere of interest and within the
itexus of a certain association. This element which is of
fundamental importance in the conception of a corporation
may be designated as subjective differentiation."' This is no
unreal abstraction. The acts of a person are different as he
acts in different capacities. Hence a shareholder of a railroad
company has no direct right of property in the rolling stock,
"The principle involved in subjective differentiation is simply that
the shareholder's right to act and the effect of his act depends upon
some matter personal (subjective) to himself, viz.: whether or not he
has acted within the sphere (nexus) of action circumscribed by his
share of stock. Suppose, for example, that all of the capacities in which
a man could act, were three in number. i.As a citizen. 2. As a member of Congress. 3. As a member of the X Railroad Company.
His acts as a member of Congress have no effect whatever upon
the inner life of the X Railroad Company, and vice versa. To whatever
extent he participates in the acts of the railroad company it must be in
his capacity as a stockholder in a meeting with the other stockholders,
and in compliance with the formalities prescribed-in other words, his
acts are effective as a stockholder only when performed within the bond
or nexus of association. Going one step farther we determine the nature and effect of his act by dissecting his personality into three capacities and deciding within which of these capacities the act under discussion falls. This is subjective differentiation.
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roadbed, cars, etc. He cannot use a car at his pleasure, and
he is a trespasser if he attempt to perform acts of ownership.
His property right can be exercised only through the nexus
of association, only in a meeting with his associates, and
then only through the performance of certain functions in a
certain manner. In a meeting with his associates his will
may prevail or be disregarded, but his action outside of this
connection is of no effect whatever.
From saying the right does not belong to A generally, but
to A only in a certain capacity, it is only a short step to say
the right belongs to the personal holder and representative
of a certain interest, whether the personal holder is A or B.
We substitute, in other words, for a specific person a representative capacity; the right follows its object; that is, the
interest instead of its subject, namely, the holder. This may
be called the objective determination I" of the inherence of
rights, another important element in the conception of a
corporation. A right must always be connected with some
ascertainable person in order to identify it and secure it
against other conflicting interests. The name of an individual usually furnishes this means of identification, which is
called the title. But in the case of the objective determination of the right, the means of identification is a certain
interest embodied in concrete conditions so that the title
remains the same as long as the interest continues regardless of change of person. They become the indifferent and
shifting actors of the character which is not affected by
their individualities.
If we correctly understand the qualified nature of the
inherence of rights in the persons associated, the conception
of the association follows easily as a simple sum of the rights
so qualified.
The member of a corporation being able only to exercise
his corporate rights only within the nexus of association,
"While the nature of the act of the shareholder is determined by
subjective differentiation, the inherence of his rights is determined objectively. viz.: by reference to an object, to the share of stock. The
right inheres in the person who owns the share of stock.
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individual exercise must be consolidated into collective exercise. The controlling will appears, therefore, as a unit.
This outward unity is expressed by a collective name and
title, which stands for an aggregate, but an aggregate of
similar component parts. But since the individual's share
in the joint act is scarcely perceptible, his acts as a private
person are kept separate from his acts in conjunction with
others and the law treats corporation and member as two
different holders (of rights) and for all practical purposes
only such treatment can do justice to the nature of the relation. Where two corporate bodies have practically the
same members, the test of the distinctiveness of their rights
and obligations is whether or not there is such independence
of interest and control that the acts of the one organization
can under any circumstances legally affect the rights of the
other.
The aggregate body also partakes of the nature of its
constituent elements in being affected by the objective determination of the inherence of rights. That is to say, the
corporate name indicates, not a group of particular individuals, but the objective element, let us say property, of the
relation. It is not the presence of the shareholder that goes
to make up the personnel of the corporation, it is the association of a certain interest, represented by a share of stock,
with any individual, that, with other shares, make up the
thing for which the corporate name stands. The rights belong to a definite group of persons, at any one time, but the
personal reference is defined by association and not by individuality. An individual, in other words, does not bestow
a certain character on his interest or share, but the interest
defines the share or participation of the shareholder. The
personal nex-us is uniform as each member represents an
interest which is the same for all, but is essentially continuous. The shares of stock are outstanding in the names of
some individuals, A, B, C-K, or L, M, N-X, it is a matter
of indifference which; the name of the corporation has no
different significance, nor is its connotation altered.
The salient characteristics of the body corporate, unity,
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distinctiveness, identity in succession, hence appear as corollaries of the principle of representative action.
If we analyze this outline of what, for convenience, will
be referred to as the representative theory, the principles
established will resolve themselves somewhat in this fashion.
I. Corporations are essentially property holding bodies,
in which the control of the property and the interest in it,
are separated. Certain persons control the property for the
benefit of the abstract and ideal interest designated by the
name of the corporation.
2. Thus the complex interests of the corporate members are personified by assimilation to a personal beneficiary,
which has no real existence beyond the needs of convenience. The name affords besides a tie, which binds together those engaged as stockholders in the enterprise.
3. Large bodies of men being unable to act as a unit the
corporate body acts by original representation. The act
of a portion, such- as a majority, is recognized as binding
all.
4. The choice of the action which shall bind all is determined by subjective differentiation, whereby may be ascertained those who have acted under the common bond, as
against those who have not.
5. The location or inherence of the right to act or help
to act, is determined objectively by reference to the share
of stock. The person who owns the stock and his individuality are matters of indifference.
6. The property of the corporation is a fund out of which
certain obligations are to be satisfied, all to be determined
by reference to the name of the corporation.
7. Each shareholder being the owner of a qualified right,
the association must be conceived as the sum of the rights
so qualified. Each individual can exercise his right only
within the nexus of association, and hence, individual exercise must be consolidated into collective exercise. The
controlling will therefore appears as a unit.
8. Since the individual's share in joint acts is scarcely
perceptible his acts as a private person are kept separate
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from his acts in conjunction with others, and the law therefore must treat corporation and member as two distinct
holders of rights.
These propositions may be considered the principal
elements in the conception of a corporation afforded by
the representative theory. It must be observed, however,
that a definition which leaves its two distinctive and radical features ambiguous, does not offer an adequate solution
of the problem which it purports to resolve.
Two principles in this conception are fundamental, viz.,
original representation and the modification of the conventional theory of rights.
The principle of representation may be recognized as a
form of agency. Its effect is that some persons may
dispose of the rights of others without proper legal acts
on the part of those who own them. This is at least debatable. The corporation connotes both activity and the
ownership of property. The question is whether or not
the effect of action by a majority, is to dispose of the
rights of others without proper legal action. If one hundred
shareholders pass upon a corporate act in a stockholders'
meeting, the act being adopted by a vote of sixty to forty,
the acquiescence of the forty is equivalent to participation.
If the action of the majority is oppressive, the minority
may prevent the action or set it aside. 20 If a matter of
internal government, and they do not care to participate,
they have always a way of retreat from a solvent corporation by a sale of their stock. If the acts from which
they dissent have a tendency to impoverish or destroy the
corporation, they again have redress. 21
Let us consider the position of the defeated electors in a
republic. The relative strength of the voters may be eight
millions against six millions. If the minority acquiesce in
the election, they become parties to the act, and the president or other official is their president. Their resistance
' Bagshaw v. Eastern Union Ry. Co., 7 Hare, 130.

' Bagshaw v. Eastern Union Ry. Co., supra.
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could be made very effective, if, as a body, they decided to
exert it. The impending emigration of any large proportion
of a body of people because of dissatisfaction or unwillingness to participate in the acts of a majority will inevitably so modify the acts of the majority that the acts finally
adopted will represent truly the acts of all. Corporate action is therefore the act of all the associates, wherever the
defeated parties acquiesce.
If this illustration seem extravagant, one need only consult the immigration records of the United States. "The
increment of national population from immigration alone
has reached 1,3oo,ooo a year! America is depopulating
Europe." In New York alone, there are "more Irish than
in Dublin, more Italians than in Rome, more Germans
than in Munich, and more Jews than there ever were in
Jerusalem, if not in all of Palestine." 22 These-are factsthey are not debatable. The Governments of Europe, to
prevent entire loss of the discontented minority have done
what? First, in some cases they have imposed restrictions
on emigration, a repressive measure doomed to inevitable
failure, since an attempt to compel submission to evil conditions from which a way of escape lies at hand will be
evaded by disobedience or fraud. Second, by alleviating the
conditions that have produced the discontent-in other
words, by granting the desires of the minority-which, is
in effect, if they accept and acquiesce, making them participants in the act of the state. We assume, as axiomatic, that
the ultimate source of all governmental power resides in
the consent of the governed.
But there are more serious difficulties in the way. It is
necessary, before accepting the representative theory to
modify our conception of rights. "If the individual, private,
and beneficial right is to measure and govern all rules relating to rights of whatsoever nature, then the corporate
right will continue to be abnormal and illogical. If, on the
other hand, we emancipate ourselves from the absolute rec" Ivins and Mason, The Control of Public Utilities, Preface, X.
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ognition of one form of right as orthodox, if we admit that
the incidents of a right may vary according to the difference of interests for the protection of which it exists, and
according to the difference of conditions under which that
protection must operate, we may well arrive at the conclusion, that in dealing with the association of persons we must
modify the ideas which we have derived from the right of
property in individuals, and what has first seemed to be an
anomaly will appear simply as another but equally legitimate
form of development." 23
So much as this should not be necessary. The corporation is truly an abnormal form of development, if, in order
to make it a legitimate form of development, we must
abandon the conventional idea of rights. The word right
is one of the constants of legal reasoning. If its attributes
are to be shifted-if its connotation is to be altered with
the changing circumstances under which it is exercised, it is
somewhat difficult to discover what is gained by having a
rational theory of corporations. Was it not Procrustes
who had a bed which -fit all of his guests-the short ones
were stretched-the long ones were cut to size.
But our premises merit further scrutiny. The principle
of subjective differentiation enables us to decide between
majority and minority by selecting the act of those who
have acted under the common bond as against those who
have not. The majority therefore, acts within the nexus of
association. Does not the minority do the same? It would
seem not, under the view proposed. The nexus of association then, cannot be a factor of weight in the reasoning
employed, nor would it seem to justify the law in selecting
anyone as against any other. For, the bond of the associates
is the same for all-the interest of all is uniform-the act
of a stockholder is effective only within the nexus of association. But apparently, although a stockholder has done
all of this, his failure to agree with the majority has placed
his act beyond the nexus of association. If this be true, the
Freund, Legal Nature of Corporations, p.48.
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courts have no right, in any event, to interfere on behalf of
the minority stockholders, oppressed or not. "Acting in a
meeting with his associates the relative strength of position
will determine the effect of his acts; his will may prevail
or be defeated, according to a preponderance of concordance between the associates, but his will and action outside
of this connection has no effect whatever.2 4 The minority shareholder thus becomes the victim of a nexus which is
as variable as his rights.
If now, the inherence of the right may be determined
objectively, is it true that the location of the right is a
matter of indifference? Are the stockholders 'the shifting
and indifferent actors of a character which is not affected
by their individuality? 25 If a corporation were simply a
mass of property, this assertion might be made with some
degree of plausibility. It is, however, manifestly contrary
to the facts. The X and Y railroad corporations have
parallel and competing lines. They are so situated that
they drain the same territory, and the competition threatens
the life of both. Their policies are antagonistic. The X
company or its stockholders, in the market acquire a controlling interest in the Y company, and a change in the
policies of the two roads is immediately perceptible. Schedules are changed, mutually hostile resolutions are abandoned-they operate under some friendly agreement. Has
the character of Y changed or not? Are the new stockholders of Y shifting and indifferent actors of a character
unaffected by their individualities? Illustrations of this
sort might be multiplied. Is it a matter of indifference that
a large proportion of the stockholders of a newspaper corporation have an interest in the advocacy of a protective
tariff ?
But the property of the corporation presents more difficulties. The name of the corporation indicates that certain obligations are to be satisfied out of a certain fund, to
" Freund, op. cit. p. 34.
'Freund, op. cit. p. 35.
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be determined by reference tp the corporate name. Obligations are owing. They are not owing by the name, nor by
the fund. Whose obligations are they? What determines
how, when and why they are to be paid. The fund exists.
To whom does the fund belong? A theory of corporations
which slights this question has really gone but a short distance toward the solution of corporate activity. And if the
name be a convenient fiction byreference to which all of
these questions of right, of obligations, of title to funds
are to be answered, a corporate name has a content different from that of all other names. We must add to this
that the name likewise represents a collective or controlling
will, which, since individual exercise of rights is in the
corporation consolidated into collective exercise, appears as
a unit. This proposition carries us in an ingenious circle to
the precise point at which we started, viz., that there is a
controlling and collective will acting as a unit. When we
conclude, finally that the individual's acts as a private person must be kept separate from his acts in conjunction with
others, because his share in the joint act is scarcely perceptible; in other words because it cannot be separated from
the joint act, the effort to solve the problem of corporate
existence by superadding the principle of agency to that
of the persona ficta becomes hopeless.
It should be recalled that the representative conception
involves an analysis of rights into control and interest, the
use of fictitious personality to a limited extent, and the application of the principle of agency. Let us now consider
all joint holding of property as a peculiar state of propert3

26

II. Property exists in two states, the individual and the
collective. The corporationis a form of collective property.
Collective property is not to be confounded with co-ownership of individual property in an undivided state. While
it remains undivided, there is nevertheless, autonomy 27
Planiol, Droit Civil, Tome I., pp. 970, et seq.
MAutonomy.

The author quoted intends, of course, by autonomy

here, identifiability or individuality.
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of the portion of each individual; every part, although actually confused with the others, has its own proprietor, and he
is independent of the others. He alone can deal with his
portion. Co-ownership of undivided property therefore, is
always individual property, with actual confusion of the
parts. Furthermore, this confusion is necessarily transitory
and accidental. The mingling or confusion is not the object-is not a permanent characteristic of this kind of property; its characteristics on the contrary are isolation and
independence, and for this reason, the very state of being
undivided tends naturally toward partition and provokes it.
Collective property is nothing of the sort. It is a peculiar
state of property, which is in itself an end, and which has
its own raison d'etre. It results from the necessary grouping of the persons to whom it belongs. There are many
classes of property which must be transformed into this
state, in order that they may render to mankind all of the
services of which they are susceptible, and which are not
destined to become the object of private property. The distinction between these two classes of property consists of
more than words. The difference lies in this, that collective
property suppresses the antonomy of the individual partsindeed, to be exact, these parts do not exist; the property or
thing is used in common or, there is a complete affectation
to the general utility, which in most cases takes place without any contact whatever with the thing utilized. It is
thus that the entire nation profits by the strength of its
fortresses or of its ironclads, although the citizens may not
have individually either usage or possession, and although
the majority of them may never have seen them. Individual
property is unable in itself to satisfy all the needs of mankind, from which it results that it is necessary to preserve
the two classes of property side by side, and the partition of
collective property so that it may become the object of individual utility is a question of opportunity and convenience.
These classifications may become clearer if we consider
an example of each. A is the owner of a house. He owns
it individually-it is individual property. A and B own the
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same house, jointly or in common. A may sell his half, B
may sell his half. The share of each, though unsevered, is
his individual property, and may by appropriate proceedings be set out to him. The house is still individual property.
A, B, C, D and E form a corporation which purchases
the same house. A nor B nor C has any distinguishable
share in the house. There is no way in which his share
can be severed. In other words there is complete affectation of the house to the general utility of A, B, C, D, and E.
The collective ownership of property involves no conception of a person, real or fictitious. The power of words
is such that, this word person once launched into circulation,
has attached to it an absolute value. We lose sight of the
reality, and no longer think that these pretended persons are
but devices to simplify the administration of corporate
property. And thus originates the theory of a kind of persons instead of the theory of a kind of property. The
most serious effect of personification of the corporation is
that the fictitious person gradually assumes the attributes of
real persons. Most authors concede to the fiction the same
rights and the same capacity as a real person, saving two
exceptions, viz.: I. When, in the nature of things it is
impossible, as in the case of family relations. 2. When
their capacity is limited by law. But it is conceded likewise that such beings do not participate in the privileges of
the law of nature, because they are creatures of the legislature which may treat them as it will.
These are words without sense, because there are not
two kinds of persons. There is but one, and the law makes
its enactments only for men, for their liberties and for
their goods. What the legislator finds before him is men'
individuals, citizens, either isolated or in groups, and, when
his law is unjust, it is no imaginary person that suffers.
IBy the name of fictitious person, or juristic person, must
be understood the existence of collective property in the
state of distinct masses, possessed by groups of men, more
or less numerous and elminated from individual control.
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Where then is the necessity of creating a second class of
persons, which has no existence in nature, to comprehend a
second form of property, the existence of which is a self
evident truth ?28

The ultimate holder of every right is man.29 The rights
that form the patrimony of the juristic person are for the
benefit of the individual members of the corporation, present or future. It is not an accidental effect, but the very
object of the relation. The individual members are the real
subjects of the juristic person. Practical considerations require that the common interests of the corporation- be
pursued, not by the individual members, but by the collective group of members, represented by an artificial personal
unity. But this juristic person is incapable of playing any
part as such, it has neither interests nor aims. Nor can it
have rights, for rights are possible only where they have
attained their destination, that is to say, where they can be
useful to their holder. A right which can never attain its
goal in the person of such a holder is a chimera that cannot
be reconciled with the fundamental idea of the principles of
law. Such an anomaly can exist only in appearance. The
apparent subject of law conceals the real one.
The fiction is not the real holder of the corporate right,
the fiction is but one step in the administration of the property, and the rights that are attributed to the persona ficta,
in vitalizing it, belong in reality to the individuals for whom
it is a formula. For example, the Louvre belongs to the
French, and the British Museum to the English. When it is
said that they belong to France or to England, we make use
of an abstract formula which there is no need to materialize.
The world knows no holders of rights but men.
"When this view is adopted, all of the difficulties associated with the persona ficta vanish. The majority of the
questions to be resolved upon this subject are difficult only
because they are badly put. We rectify this difficulty and
Planiol, op. cit. pp. 975, 976.
Ihring, Geist des Romischen Rechts.
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we see that what is called a persona ficta is but a peculiar
kind of riches, viz., property in its collective form, and
that there are no persons, but human beings." 30
The problems of corporate activity then become these:
I. Given, property of a certain kind.
2. The formation of a common mass.
3. Its administration.
4. Its dissolution.
Everything proceeds then, in the simplest pbssible fashion.
Juristic acts of all kinds, sales, purchases, loans, payments,
mortgages, are made for the profit of the collectivity, in the
same manner as for individuals, and they produce the same
effects. The rules applicable to the administration of individual property hold good for collective property.
By means of the conception of collective property we have
now reached our starting point. We begin with a problem,
and we end with the same problem, except that for some
reason it is no longer a problem. Whatever rules are applicable to the individual apply to the corporation. This
is idle talk. A shareholder either has a reconizable interest
in corporate property or he has not. If he has not, how is
his interest to be treated on the same basis as if it were
individual property. Or treating the corporate property as
collective property and dealing with the common mass of
property in its relation to the group as a whole, on the
same basis as if they were individuals similarly placed, what
role is assigned to the collectivity. What is the collectivity
that is to be treated as an individual. And we begin again
inevitably to personify. It seems as if this collectivity that
confronts us inexorably at every turn in the path acted
much like a reality.
To treat the property as the problem, and its controlling
factor-to solve the actions of men united in groups for
the attainment of some common end, by reference to collective property, is, if flippancy be permissible, letting the
tail wag the dog. Our problems are too varied to be thus
' Planiol, op. cit. p. 977.
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dismissed. Our corporations have citizenship, domicile,
they commit torts, 'recover damages for torts committed
against them, and act and appear as units. It is beside the
question that ultimate rights reside in the individuals. That
question may well rest until we have to deal with the individual. It is beside the question that the ultimate rights
to French warships and fortresses are really in the Frenchmen and not in France, in an abstract unreal France. That
might be a very nice question, if the French nation were
dissolved, and it is questionable whether the individuals
that composed the French nation at that time could make
good their title. In any event, we never have to deal with
the ultimate rights of the Frenchmen while we must deal
with the French nation. Let the ultimate rights in the
Pennsylvania Railroad Company be wherever you choose,
but the present rights concern us most. Violate those rights
and who redresses them? And are they actual rights or
imaginary ones?
We cannot leave this question unanswered, "Is the corporation a right and duty bearing unit?" If it is not, our
corporation still needs an interpreter, for it does, and yet
theoretically cannot do.
The shareholder's rights cannot be adjusted by saying
that we must deal with the situation precisely as we do
in the case of any other individual owning property. For
if the stockholder is the ultimate "destinataire" of corporate property, why put him in the anomalous position of
having neither interest nor control of his goods. Nor may
the question be dismissed by saying, "Avaunt, spectral person, there is no being but the human." France, real or unreal, must be dealt with; the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, not its stockholders, for the present, at least, confronts us. The question of its rights as a group must be
answered. And we cannot ignore its responsibility when
none can be fastened upon the stockholders.
The object of uniting men in the form of corporations
is not the holding of property. That is generally an incident, it is true, of corporate activity. But it is not a
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necessary incident. The limitation of the shareholder's liability is likewise generally an incident of corporate holding
-it is not a necessary incident. The property, of itself,
produces no results. It is the effect of corporate activity,
whether in connection with property or not, that gives rise
to concern. The formula proposed must answer the three
questions already stated. Does the corporation have rights
and duties? Is it responsible? What are the rights of
those who compose it? The modern view is in accord
with the tendency that has subordinated the unlimited application of laisser faire to the expressed will of the genus.
In other words, in recognizing to the fullest extent, the
principle of individual freedom, account must be taken of
the fact that individual activity stands below generic activity. The corporate genus, therefore, is expressed by this
formula:
III. The corporation is a right and duty bearing unit,
which belongs in the class of persons.
George F. Deiser.

(To be Continued.)

